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Abstract 
This article describes the development and application of a safety culture assessment 
approach for nuclear power plants based on Schein’s culture model. The developed multi-
method approach aimed to unfold deeper levels of culture, and, at the same time, to be 
applicable by practitioners and transparent in producing meaningful results. In Study 1 
we describe the development of the method and its application in a German nuclear 
power plant. Study 2 presents a cross-validation of the approach in a second German 
nuclear power plant. The evaluation results of the approach reveal adequate validity with 
regard to the obtained results and its perceived linkage to safety culture in both plants. It 
becomes evident that the approach allows for deriving basic assumptions of plant 
members and demonstrating their significance for safety performance. Moreover, it can 
be shown that it is worthwhile to go beyond the assessment of artifacts and espoused 
values in understanding cultural dynamics on a plant level. Finally, insights and 
limitations of the developed approach are discussed and reflected. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of safety culture is a worldwide accepted and popular perspective on 
optimizing collective human behavior in nuclear power plants. Developed and promoted 
shortly after the nuclear accident in Chernobyl (INSAG-4, 1991), safety culture has 
become a prominent vehicle in explaining and evaluating human performance in high-
reliability settings. International agencies and regulators, as well as operating companies, 
develop guidelines, policies, assessment methods, and interventions aimed at the 
optimization of culture, and therefore safety.  Stressing a systemic view of safety, the 
concept involves individual, organizational, and inter-organizational factors influencing 
the availability and safety of nuclear power plants. Recently, this perspective has been 
highlighted by an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report (2014) of an 
international expert meeting in response to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
power plant. Reflecting on the causation of such a large-scale accident, the report 
promotes a holistic view of safety culture, claiming that “the interaction of human, 
organizational and technical factors across all stakeholder organizations and between 
different levels inside each organization must be evaluated and understood for each phase 
of the nuclear facility life cycle”(p. 30).   
In contrast, scientific debate on safety culture reveals a critical, somewhat alarming 
picture of the concept and its application in the industry. For instance, Rollenhagen 
(2010) identifies a misuse of the concept in hiding shortcomings of technological design. 
Hopkins (2002) claims practitioners to see culture primarily as a matter of individual 
mindsets. As a consequence, blame is attributed to individual worker attitudes in causing 
accidents instead of focusing on latent work conditions and their contributing factors. 
Accordingly, Reiman and Rollenhagen (2014) come to the conclusion that safety culture 
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is not sufficiently integrated into classical engineering principles and concepts. They 
disqualify the concept from its assumed system-oriented perspective on safety.  
These conflicting foci on safety culture are often drawn from a conceptual confusion 
surrounding definitions and operationalization of safety culture (e.g., Hale, 2000; 
Guldenmund, 2000; 2007; Silbey, 2009; Myers, Nyce and Dekker, 2014): How deep should 
one dig to assess culture? Is safety culture quantifiable? And who is responsible if 
something has gone wrong? The answers to those questions allow for a huge diversity in 
interpretation due to the holistic nature of the concept. Thus, dealing with safety culture 
is a double-edged endeavor. On the one hand, it is one of the most acknowledged 
approaches in strengthening human performance in complex technological systems by 
capturing a broad range of factors, especially in nuclear power plants. On the other hand, 
the danger of misuse and disappointment is still present when bringing a scientifically 
vague concept into practice.  
This article describes the results of a research project aimed at the development, 
application, and evaluation of a safety culture assessment method in nuclear power 
plants. It aims at contributing to a more common and positive understanding of the 
concept in bridging practical and conceptual challenges. Moreover, we wish to share our 
research experiences in developing a method tackling deeper levels of safety culture in 
the field, i.e., examining basic assumptions that may drive safety-oriented behavior in 
nuclear power plants. In the following, the applied background and methodological 
challenges of assessing safety culture are illustrated by focusing on Ed Schein’s model of 
organizational culture (1985; 1990). Next, the development of the method, its application, 
and evaluation in a reference nuclear power plant (Study 1), and its validation in a second 
plant (Study 2) is presented. Finally, insights and limitations of the developed approach 
are discussed. 
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2. Challenges of assessing safety culture in the nuclear power industry context 
Since the nuclear accident at the Chernobyl plant, a vast number of initiatives for 
optimizing safety culture have been introduced within the nuclear power industry. 
Starting with the INSAG-4 publication (1991), the concept mainly serves as an 
explanatory model, assumed to capture the opaque interplay between primarily non-
technical parts of an organization as accident-contributing factors.  Subsequent efforts put 
the concept into practice by focusing on the definition of safety culture and elaborating its 
facets. These initiatives were converted into guidelines (e.g., INSAG-15, 2002), policy 
statements (e.g., NRC-2010-0282) or regulations (e.g., KTA 1402). At the same time, safety 
culture has become a prominent issue in peer consultations at national (e.g., VGB, 2013) 
and international levels (e.g., SCART-Guidelines, 2008).  
One crucial assumption underlying these initiatives is that there is an ideal safety culture, 
which has been extensively elaborated in several frameworks (e.g., INSAG-4, 1991; 
SCART-Guidelines, 2008; IAEA, 2009). These frameworks support the assessment of the 
status quo of a given plant and allow the derivation of strategies for improvement. 
However, interpreting safety culture as a normative concept stands in stark contrast to 
the scientific understanding of the concept (Schein, 2014). Going back to Edgar Schein’s 
(1990) initial (still among the most popular academic) definition, organizational culture 
represents a set of shared basic assumptions learned by a group to cope with its problems 
of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be 
considered as valid (p. 111). Here, culture is understood as a dynamic concept developed 
from the learning experiences of its members. Contrasting an organization’s structures, 
systems, and members’ behavior against general templates of an ideal safety culture 
might underweight the unique learning experiences of a given organization (Wilpert & 
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Schöbel, 2007). A similar argument has been put forward by Reiman & Rollenhagen 
(2014) regarding the use of questionnaires for assessing safety culture. They state that 
confronting organizational members with preselected dimensions does “not necessarily 
uncover the issues that the personnel neglect to consider or that they consider 
insignificant for safety” (Reimann & Rollenhagen, 2014, p. 11; see also: Guldenmund, 
2007). From this it follows that one may conclude that an important requirement for 
assessing safety culture is a focus on the uniqueness of a given culture with regard to the 
learning experiences of its members.   
Another challenge for tackling safety culture is the question of what elements of culture 
one should focus on. Whereas first definitions of the concept have remained relatively 
vague (e.g., “characteristics and attitudes in organization and individuals”, INSAG-4, 
1991), subsequently developed nuclear power plant-specific definitions clearly link 
safety culture to human behavior and corresponding psychological variables; e.g., 
“amalgamation of values, standards, morals and norms of acceptable behavior” (IAEA, 
1998, p. 3) or “the core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by 
leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of 
people and the environment” (NRC, 2011, p. 34773). These understandings converge to a 
more scientific definition of the concept, stressing the importance of deeper or 
“intangible” levels of culture such as internalized values or norms. At the same time, they 
leave open room for interpretation with regard to the elements of safety culture. In 
applied nuclear power contexts, a behavior-focused understanding of culture is favored, 
because behavior “is what people do and say, and it is a mean to an end — the results. It 
is observable and measurable” (IAEA, 2013, p. 4). Safety culture is conceptualized as 
“instrumental in achieving alignment within the facility and in promoting the desired 
behaviors for overall performance improvement” (IAEA, 2013, p.17). Less attention is 
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given to deeper levels or the so-called core of culture. Going back Schein’s (1990; 2004) 
definition, safety performance is driven by basic assumptions, which are taken for granted 
and the ‘‘deepest, often unconscious part of a group’’ (Schein, 2004, p. 14). Thus, tackling 
“symptoms” of culture by focusing solely on (desired) behavior clearly risks ignoring and 
underrating cultural dynamics (Schein, 1990; Hale, 2000). Bringing safety culture into 
practice is therefore challenged by the necessity to tackle those deeper levels of culture 
and to demonstrate their potential sequels for daily operations. In the following, we will 
discuss conceptualizations of deeper levels of culture and potential ways of gathering 
insights into these levels. 
3. Deeper levels of safety culture  
As stated above, Schein (1985, 1990, 2004) conceptualizes the core of an organizational 
culture as shared basic assumptions, which are implicitly taken for granted and not 
challenged by members of a given culture. These assumptions define valid ways of 
perceiving and reacting to problems in organizations and develop along six dimensions, 
i.e., the nature of reality and truth, time, space, human nature, human activity and human 
relationships. They manifest themselves in artifacts and espoused values. Whereas 
artifacts describe observable elements in an organization (e.g., behavior, documents, 
systems), espoused values are their verbal counterpart derivable from asking members 
questions “about the things the organization values” (Schein, 1999, p. 17). However, 
neither artifacts nor espoused values are easily attributable to deeper levels of culture. 
Both are subject to uncertainty with regard to the meanings that members of a given 
culture attach to them, especially when inconsistencies between manifestations on the 
level of artifacts and espoused values exist (e.g., when management communicates the 
importance of rule compliance but, on the other hand, accepts rule-violations). According 
to Schein (1999), these inconsistencies provide clues to important deeper levels of 
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thought and perception (i.e., to basic assumptions), which are assumed to drive overt 
behavior. Importantly, these inconsistencies often signal problems stemming from 
dysfunctional cultural dynamics, which clearly demands tackling those deeper levels 
when assessing culture.  
However, the majority of existing methods seldom adopt this perspective for going 
beyond the assessment of artifacts and espoused values. For instance, questionnaires, 
which naturally address only both upper levels, are still a very popular method of 
diagnosing safety culture in nuclear power plants (e.g., Lee & Harrison, 2000; Garcia-
Herrero et al., 2013). Yet, uncovering deeper layers of culture is a difficult undertaking, 
which comprises the application of qualitative or anthropological methods mainly via 
fieldwork and participant observation (or using an iterative clinical approach, Schein, 
1990). There are only a few papers on safety culture that have adopted such approaches. 
One of them is a study by Brooks (2008) using an ethnographic research method to 
describe the organizational culture of a small manufacturing business. He conducted 
open-ended interviews and observations to collect observational data about artifacts and 
espoused values. Based on Schein's (1985) taxonomy of cultural assumptions, he moved 
through the data collection in an iterative process (“Hermeneutical Canons of 
Interpretation”) to better understand the meaning and therefore the assumptions defined 
by the members of culture. Guldenmund (2010a) conducted a case study in a service 
company combining qualitative (e.g., focus groups, interviews) and quantitative (e.g., 
questionnaires) methods for the diagnosis and description of safety culture. The 
qualitatively obtained data provide the context within which the quantitative data are 
interpreted. In an afterword to this study, Guldenmund (2010a) lists a preliminary set of 
deciphered basic assumptions structured according to the six dimensions of Schein 
(1985).  
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Based on this, it becomes evident that the proper application of both methods, i.e., 
qualitative and quantitative, might advance the revelation of deeper cultural levels. 
However, thus far, almost no common knowledge and experiences are available about 
ways to identify relevant basic assumptions of members of an organization.  
In the following, we present a multi-method approach of safety culture assessment based 
on Schein’s culture model. The method provides the possibility to identify relevant basic 
assumptions that are assumed to drive the safety-oriented behavior in the organization. 
The development and application of this approach was realized in two nuclear power 
plants (NPPs). In Study 1 we describe the development of the approach and its first 
application in an NPP, which we will refer to as “reference plant” in the following. Study 2 
presents the results of cross-validating the approach in a second NPP. 
 
4. Study 1: Development and feasibility test of the assessment approach 
The assessment approach is based on Schein ́s (1985, 1992, 2004) model of 
organizational culture. It provides methods for assessing culture on all three different 
levels, i.e., artifacts, espoused values, and basic underlying assumptions. Following 
Schein’s advice, a focus on inconsistencies between artifacts and espoused values was 
chosen as the main strategy for compiling three specific assessment steps focusing on 
deeper cultural levels. The assessment starts with an artifacts analysis (step 1), which is 
followed by a gap analysis, i.e., an analysis that contrasts assessed artifacts against 
espoused values (step 2), and is completed by an assumption analysis (step, 3). The basic 
structure of the approach is presented in Figure 1. Because manifestations on those three 
levels represent interacting elements of culture, the three assessment steps are closely 
interlinked. Specifically, the results from one analysis step provide the starting material 
for the next — deeper — analysis step. As a consequence, the approach is not assumed to 
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provide a complete picture of a given safety culture. Instead, the intention was to develop 
an assessment approach that allows for gaining insights into important elements of the 
culture under study (Schein, 1992, p. 28). In the following, we briefly introduce the three 
developed methods in more detail.  
 
Figure 1. Overview of the assessment steps of the developed safety culture assessment approach 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Development and description of the artifact analysis  
The goal of the artifact analysis is to identify those plant-specific artifacts that are relevant 
to plant members in establishing safe and reliable plant performance. Artifacts represent 
a broad category comprising everything that “you see, hear and feel as you hang around” 
(Schein, 1999, p. 15). They reflect learning experiences of organizational members in 
responding to problems of external adaptation (e.g., how to deal with requirements 
stemming from regulators) and internal integration (e.g., how to establish safety-directed 
leadership) with regard to the safe operation of the plant.  
In developing a method for the artifact analysis that may feasibly be applied in any NPP, 
we focused on safety behavior of the members of an NPP by collecting basic safety-
relevant work practices. These are specific modes of behavior that members of an NPP 
apply in their daily work, which are accessible by observation. It can be assumed that such 
practices represent “…particular ways of conducting organizational functions that have 
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evolved over time” and that “practices reflect the shared knowledge and competence of 
the organization” (Kostova, 1999, p. 309; see also Wilderom, van den Berg & Wiersma, 
2012). Based on this understanding, we considered work practices as patterns of 
recurrent behavior that reflect manifestations of a given organizational culture (Hofstede, 
2001). Furthermore, work practices represent a well-known concept in the nuclear 
community (e.g., in terms of best practices in IAEA-TECDOC-743, 1994; IAEA-TECDOC-
1358, 2003). Thus, focusing on these practices was assumed to be well accepted in this 
particular industrial domain.  
For the artifact analysis, a list of 64 work practices was compiled (see Table 1 for some 
work practice examples). This compilation is based on (1) an extensive literature search, 
(2) participant observation by one member of the research team (over a period of one 
month), and (3) the conductance of 12 semi-structured interviews with employees and 
supervisors from different plant departments. The collected work practices were then 
counterchecked and rephrased by two members of the nuclear power plant guaranteeing 
their comprehensibility. Furthermore, they were structured according to a safety 
management framework. This framework was developed in accordance with existing 
safety management conceptualizations (Diaz-Cabrera et al., 2007; Guldenmund, 2007; 
Haber et al., 1995; Hale, R., Kirwan & Guldenmund, 1999; INSAG-13, 1999; Kennedy & 
Kirwan, 1998; Weil & Apostolakis, 2001) and allows assigning all collected practices to 
four management domains, i.e., risk management, task management, management of 
technical resources, and management of human resources. These four domains were 
further differentiated into ten facets (see Table 1 for an overview).  
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Table 1. Safety management framework with corresponding facets and examples of work practices 
Management domain Facet Practice (example) 
Risk management Monitoring (identification and diagnosis 
of process deviations) 
Employees report safety deficiencies. 
  
Changing (evaluation and intervention 
regarding deviations) 
 
Lessons learned from event analyses 
were communicated to the staff. 
Task management Accomplishing (work tasks) Employees notice improvement 
opportunities and actively seek 
advancements. 
 Organizing (structuring responsibilities 
and processes) 
 
Responsibilities, functions and tasks 
are clearly conferred. 
 Communicating (coordination of 
information flow) 
Employees communicate their 
experiences to their colleagues. 
Human resource management Planning (requirements planning and 
competence preservation) 
Staff planning considers and 
counteracts a potential loss of 
competencies. 
 Qualifying (promoting and developing) Training is evaluated on a regular 
basis. 
 Leading (motivating and controlling 
personnel) 
Supervisors discuss with their staff 
how deficiencies may be corrected. 
Technical resource management Designing (design of technical 
components) 
Technical reports from suppliers are 
critically evaluated. 
  
Maintaining (maintenance and 
inspections) 
 
Maintenance intervals for inspections 
of technical components are met. 
 
 As target groups for the artifact analysis, 24 middle managers from the reference plant 
were asked to rate each of the practices with respect to its implementation in daily work. 
Because middle managers are assumed to receive requirements from top management 
and pass them to shop-floor personnel, they were supposed to be knowledgeable experts 
on daily operations in the plant (e.g., Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Zohar & Luria, 2005). The 
professional background of the middle managers covered all main departments (e.g., 
production department, maintenance department) directly involved in the safe operation 
of the plant. Middle managers’ mean length of employment was 19.68 (SD=8.5) years.   
The ratings were collected for each single work practice by means of seven-stage Likert-
scales ranging from 1 (= practice not applied) to 7 (= practice fully applied). Furthermore, 
an additional confidence judgment (i.e., how confident are you in your rating?) ranging 
from 1 (= not at all) to 7 (= completely), and a rating of familiarity with each practice 
domain (according to the safety management framework facets) was requested, because 
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different work domains of the managers should be taken into account as potentially 
biasing their ratings.  Moreover, an open question was formulated to collect additional 
relevant work practices that are not featured by the framework.  
In order to identify artifacts (work practices) that were sufficiently relevant for the 
reference plant (i.e., identifying those practices paying tribute to the specific learning 
experiences of a given culture) the ratings were first screened according to two exclusion 
criteria. First, only ratings of implemented work practices that could be confidently 
assessed by the target group were considered (i.e., only ratings that were accompanied 
by confidence ratings of 4 and above). Secondly, only work practices whose mean 
implementation ratings were on average 3.5 or higher (with a standard deviation below 
1) were considered as relevant for the plant and included in the next step of assessment, 
i.e., the gap analysis.  
For evaluation purposes, a short questionnaire was developed, which was used to 
evaluate the artifact analysis method by members of the target group. Three items 
assessed the face validity of the selected practices with regard to their relatedness to 
safety culture (e.g., “The practices are an important element of safety culture”). Four items 
were developed to rate the usability of the rating method (e.g., “The formulation of the 
practices is comprehensible”). Each of the seven items had be rated on a Likert-scale 
ranging from 1 (= strongly disagree) to 7 (= strongly agree). 
4.1.2 Development and description of the Gap Analysis  
The second step of our assessment approach aims at contrasting artifacts against the 
espoused values of organizational members. This approach is known as gap analysis (e.g., 
Boglarsky & Kwantes, 2004; Kilmann & Saxton, 2007). Whereas the artifact analysis 
identified actually implemented plant-specific safety practices, the gap analysis should 
assess the organizational members` conception of ideal safety behavior. This is based on 
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the assumption that shared espoused values are reflected in what members of an 
organization perceive as ideal behavior, ensuring proper process safety and productivity.  
To identify possible gaps between artifacts (observable behavior) and espoused values 
(ideal behavior), a questionnaire was designed and distributed to all staff members of the 
plant. Thirty eight percent of all members of the reference plant, which stemmed from all 
major departments of the plant, filled out the gap questionnaire. From this, it emerged 
that 60% of the respondents had worked for more than ten years in the plant. 
The gap questionnaire contained the work practices that had been identified as relevant 
by the artifact analysis. First, each of these work practices had to be rated according to 
their perceived actual implementation in the plant (by means of seven-stage Likert-scales 
ranging from 1 = practice not applied to 7 = practice fully applied). After that, each practice 
had to be rated with regard to what extent the practice should ideally be implemented in 
the plant (by means of seven-stage Likert-scales ranging from 1 = practice should not 
ideally be applied to 7 = practice should ideally be applied). Both questions allow us to 
directly contrast the “actual” (level of artifacts) and “ideal” ratings (level of espoused 
values) for each practice.  
 With the gap analysis, two goals are pursued: The gap analysis should allow identification 
of (1) best practices of a given plant culture and (2) inconsistencies between the perceived 
actual and ideal implementation. With regard to the identification of best practices it was 
assumed that these give hints to those basic assumptions that are consistently 
represented in shared values and corresponding working behavior of plant members. To 
identify best practices, we focused on work practices with high ratings on both their 
actual and ideal implementation. For this purpose, the practices were rank ordered 
according to practices with the highest mean ratings of actual and ideal implementation. 
Next, practices with the highest ranks on both dimensions were selected as best practices. 
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As a second criterion in case of indifference, practices with the lowest standard deviations 
accounting for the sharedness of perceived best practices were marked as best practice.  
On the other hand, the gap analysis should identify inconsistencies between the perceived 
actual and ideal implementation of the practices. According to Schein (2004), these 
inconsistencies provide clues to important basic assumptions, which drive behavior that 
is not in accordance with the espoused values of organizational members. It is of 
particular importance to know and understand these basic assumptions because although 
they are not expressed in the officially espoused values they are nevertheless important 
drivers of everyday working behavior.   
To identify inconsistencies (i.e., cultural gaps) between the perceived actual and ideal 
implementation of a practice, we defined a gap between actual and ideal implementation 
of a work practice, reflected in individual ratings, as meaningful when there was a 
difference of two scale points between the actual and ideal rating of the same work 
practice (cf. Kilman & Saxton, 2007 for a similar approach). Although this difference may 
occur in both directions, we specifically focused on practices that were (at least two scale 
points) higher rated according to their ideal than their actual implementation. In a next 
step, the frequencies of individual gaps per practice were counted, and the percentage of 
gaps in relation to the whole sample was calculated. Furthermore, an identified gap was 
considered as meaningful and relevant for the overall organization when the individual 
ratings of at least 40% of all respondents perceived this gap.  
In addition, a second questionnaire was introduced for evaluating the gap analysis. It was 
the same questionnaire as used for evaluating the artifact analysis except that we asked 
additionally for the ease of evaluating the practices according to their ideal 
implementation.  
4.1.3 Development and description of the Basic Assumptions analysis  
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The final assessment step aims at analyzing the identified gap-practices in more detail to 
understand and yield the underlying cultural dynamics and corresponding basic 
assumptions that have led to and maintain these gaps. The gap- and best practices 
identified in the former assessment step (i.e., in the gap analysis) provide the starting 
material for this assessment step. Fostering a system view of analyzing the dynamics 
behind the identified gaps, two methods were developed, both of which are based on the 
system dynamics approach (e.g., Marais, Saleh & Leveson, 2006):  a cultural dynamic 
interview and a consecutive group workshop.   
Cultural dynamic interviews 
Motivated insiders from different departments of the plant were selected as the target 
group for the interviews and workshops. These are members of the plant who had 
participated in former assessment steps, had profound knowledge of the plant’s daily 
operations, and signaled their willingness to cooperate in developing the assessment 
approach.  In total, 15 cultural dynamic interviews were conducted. Each interview lasted 
approximately one hour. 
The cultural dynamic interview started with an introduction to the “language” of the 
system dynamics approach. More specifically, the interviewees were inducted into three 
elements: reinforcing loops, balancing loops, and delays. According to Marais et al. (2006) 
a reinforcing loop displays a structure “that feeds on itself to produce growth or decline”, 
whereas a balancing loop is a structure “that attempts to move a current state to a desired 
or reference state through some action” (p. 566). A delay is used to model the time that 
elapses between cause and effect.  
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Figure 2. An image template for structuring and guiding the cultural dynamic interviews  
 
The idea was to familiarize the interviewees with these elements and enable them to 
illustrate potential cultural dynamics underlying the gaps. Moreover, the system dynamic 
language forced the interviewees to adopt a system view of cultural dynamics within their 
plant. After the introduction and familiarization phase, four questions were asked 
(depicted in an image template shown in Figure 2):  
1. What are the consequences of the fact that this practice is not ideally implemented 
in the plant? 
2. How are these consequences compensated? 
3. In what ways are these consequences being reinforced? 
4. Are there any delays and adverse effects of reinforcing and compensating factors? 
The interviewees were allowed to sketch or verbally communicate their answers. Based 
on this, the obtained data (i.e., consequences of the gaps, reinforcing and balancing loops) 
were aggregated by the project team according to the frequency of mentioning specific 
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elements in so-called “cultural dynamics images”(CDIs), which were discussed and 
further elaborated in group workshops.  
Group workshops 
Workshop participants were recruited from the same subject pool as for the cultural 
interviews, representing all major departments of the NPP. Two workshops with 13 
participants took place. Both workshops lasted one day. 
The group workshops aimed at (1) validating the CDIs, (2) identifying basic assumptions 
triggering these dynamics, and (3) finding solutions to problems depicted by the CDIs. 
Therefore, a workshop-concept was developed containing four modules. The workshops 
started with an introduction of Ed Schein’s culture model and the system dynamics 
approach to the workshop participants. After briefly describing the previous assessment 
process and corresponding results, the aggregated CDIs based on the cultural dynamic 
interviews were presented. The participants’ task was to validate the CDIs by discussing 
them in small groups and, if necessary, rearranging and adding elements. After that, 
participants assigned potential basic assumptions to (1) compensating and reinforcing 
loops of the CDIs and (2) the best practices (identified by means of the gap analysis). 
Whereas workshop participants had no problems in assigning assumptions to the best 
practices (i.e., no gap-practices), a former pilot study of the workshop with members of 
the project team revealed that eliciting assumptions for a complete CDI (i.e., the gap-
practices) was a quite difficult task. Therefore, workshop participants developed and 
assigned assumptions to single reinforcing and compensating loops in the CDIs. In the last 
module, the CDIs and the elicited assumptions were rated according to their dominance 
in the given culture (up to three assumptions from the CDIs could be named by each 
participant) and possible interventions to improve the safety culture (i.e., to close the 
gaps) were generated.  
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At the end of the workshop, participants filled out an evaluation questionnaire containing 
questions regarding the validity of the CDIs (7 Items) and the evaluation of the workshop 
method (6 Items). Again, each of the items was rated on a Likert-scale ranging from 1 (= 
strongly disagree) to 7 (= strongly agree). 
 
4.2 Results 
The presentation of application results of the approach and its evaluation in the reference 
plant will be structured in two parts. In the first part, we will provide a general overview 
of the application and the evaluation of our approach by the members of the reference 
plant who were involved in the pilot application on the three different stages of the safety 
culture assessment.  In the second part, an exemplary case of the full assessment across 
all steps of analysis is presented illustrating the feasibility and potential of the approach 
as well as providing an insight into what a typical result looks like. A more complete 
pattern of results of the pilot application cannot be provided due to concerns of the 
management of the reference plants concerning a full publication of all results.  
4.2.1 General Results: 
Evaluation of the approach. Mean evaluations of different aspects of the assessment 
approach for all three levels are provided in Table 2, together with the results of t-tests 
contrasting each mean with the (neutral) midpoint of the evaluation scales. It becomes 
evident that, on a descriptive level, all three stages of assessment and the methods used 
were generally positively evaluated with respect to their understandability, ease of use, 
and the transparency of the assessment. The results of Bonferroni corrected t-tests 
revealed significant positive differences of all mean ratings from the midpoint of the 
different scales, with only one exception (i.e., the ratings about the perceived goals of the 
workshop).   
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Table 2: Evaluation results of the three assessment steps in the reference plant with corresponding results 
of t-tests (testing for deviations from the scale midpoint of 3.5) 
Items    
     
Artifact analysis M (SD) T Df p 
Comprehensible phrasing of the practices 5.33 (0.96) 9.33 23 .0001 
Temporal adequacy 5.63 (1.40) 7.39 23 .0001 
Clarity of the instructions 5.96 (0.99) 12.1 23 .0001 
Effortlessness of the method 6.00 (0.89) 13.8 23 .0001 
Ease of evaluating the implemented practices 4.79 (1.10) 5.37 23 .0001 
Relatedness of practices to safety culture 6.25 (0.89) 15.0 23 .0001 
Relevance of the practices for safety 5.71 (0.13) 17.3 23 .0001 
Gap analysis M (SD) T Df p 
Comprehensibility of the practices 5.08 (1.20) 14.8 125 .0001 
Temporal adequacy 4.23 (1.89) 4.32 126 .0001 
Clarity of the instructions 5.47 (1.48) 14.9 126 .0001 
Effortlessness of the method 5.14 (1.59) 11.6 126 .0001 
Ease of evaluating ideal implementation of the practices 4.69 (1.42) 9.43 125 .0001 
Ease of evaluating actual implementation of the practices 4.58 (1.41) 8.54 123 .0001 
Relatedness of practices to safety culture 6.05 (0.96) 29.8 124 .0001 
Relevance of the practices for safety 5.61 (1.10) 20.8 118 .0001 
Assumption analysis M (SD) T Df p 
Practicability of the system-dynamic approach 4.85 (0.80) 6.06 12 .0001 
CDIs as description of the safety culture 4.77 (1.09) 4.19 12 .0001 
Transparency of the CDIs 5.08 (0.64) 8.87 12 .0001 
Relevance of the CDIs 4.85 (0.81) 6.06 12 .0001 
Relatedness of the CDIs to safety culture 5.00 (1.00) 5.41 12 .0001 
Importance of CDIs for change 6.00 (0.71) 12.7 12 .0001 
Implications for change 6.08 (0.86) 10.8 12 .0001 
Structure of the workshop 5.23 (0.93) 6.73 12 .0001 
Goals of the workshop 3.92 (1.50) 1.01 12 .3290 
Temporal adequacy 5.38 (1.20) 5.69 12 .0001 
Clarity of the instructions (validating) 4.92 (1.32) 3.89 12 .0001 
Clarity of instructions (weighting) 5.77 (0.43) 18.7 12 .0001 
Fun at the workshop 6.00 (1.08) 8.35 12 .0001 
Bonferroni corrected α –levels: α = .007 (artifact analysis), α = .006 (gap analysis), and α = .004 (assumption analysis) 
 
Artifact Analysis. In total, 64 work practices were rated by the sample of N=24 middle 
managers. Applying both exclusion criteria, a total of 54 practices were selected as being 
relevant and kept for the next step of assessment. No additional practices were named by 
middle managers of the reference plant.  
Gap Analysis. Applying the 40% criteria (see above), eight practices were identified as gap-
practices. Moreover, three practices were identified as best practices based on their high 
correspondence of rated actual and ideal implementation.  
Assumption Analysis. All identified eight gap-practices were fed back to plant members 
and analyzed by means of cultural interviews trying to uncover the dynamics lying behind 
the gaps. The cultural interviews revealed that interviewees had hardly any problems 
applying the system dynamics language to describe potential consequences of a given 
cultural gap with corresponding reinforcing and compensating factors. Most of them 
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favored sketching the cultural dynamics depiction rather than only naming them. As a 
result, eight CDIs were developed.  
The subsequent workshops with selected staff members of the plant generally confirmed 
the eight CDIs. Most of the improvements elicited from the workshops included a better 
wording and elaborating the CDIs. Based on this, a total of 21 basic assumptions 
underlying the three best practices and the eight CDIs (with regard to reinforcing and 
compensating loops) were identified and defined. Final ratings of the dominance of single 
assumptions in the culture reduced the number of assumptions to six.  
4.2.2 Case Study: Cultural dynamics and assumptions underlying reporting behavior 
In the following, a case from the reference plant is presented, which aims at illustrating 
the potential of the assessment approach in focusing on deeper basic assumption levels 
of safety culture. This case relates to a general and longstanding problem in high-
reliability organizations that have implemented reporting systems for incidents and near 
misses and try to motivate employees to report. One major recurrent problem here refers 
to the avoidance of blame, which is seen as a crucial factor discouraging employees from 
reporting (e.g., Reason, 1998).  
Based on the results of the artifact analysis, the practice “Employees are not blamed for 
reporting errors” was rated as highly relevant for the reference plant. However, the gap 
analysis revealed that 41% of plant members perceive a gap between the actual and ideal 
implementation of this practice. Results from subsequent cultural dynamics interviews 
showed that there was a high consensus among the interviewees with regard to the 
consequences arising from this gap. The majority of the interviewees identified a 
declining frequency of error reports as a main consequence. Additionally, they pointed 
out that a higher frequency of undetected errors in the system, a strong demotivation in 
taking over extra tasks (“When I do not do anything, I will not make any error”), and a 
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higher occurrence of errors in the long run might also result from the perceived gap. As 
compensating mechanisms, the interviewees relied on the design and functioning of the 
reporting system itself. They focused on elements of its formalization (assurance of 
anonymity and exemption from sanctioning) and the behavior of the employees 
responsible for running the system (in-depth analysis with a focus on contributing to 
work conditions and not focusing on individuals committing errors). With regard to the 
reinforcing mechanisms, the cultural dynamics interviews did not reveal a clear picture. 
The interviewees mentioned several factors such as supervising behavior, the difficulty 
to assure anonymity and high workload in general. However, it became evident that a 
more subtle type of blame from colleagues and managers is a decisive factor, which is not 
directly related to the perception and functioning of the reporting system.  
In the consecutive workshops, the results of the interviews were fed back by means of a 
CDI with one reinforcing loop solely displaying the factor “subtle blame”. Here, workshop 
participants highlighted the role of the daily morning meetings (“Morgenrunde”), where 
plant top management discusses occurrences of the previous day and current work tasks. 
A crucial issue in these meetings is the discussion of errors that have led to system 
disturbances and were not reported. In contrast to the standards of the reporting system, 
single individuals and departments are blamed in those meetings, emotionally triggered 
by the fact that these errors were not reported (although it is open to what extent they 
were reportable or could be attributed to single individuals). Moreover, the reporting 
system, with its focus on organizational learning on the one hand and the daily morning 
meetings with a focus on daily task management on the other, was perceived as only 
indirectly related or two separate systems with different goals. Consequently, plant 
management underestimated the potential effects of blaming in one system on another 
system.  
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Figure 2. CDI with assigned assumptions (yellow) for the practice “We are not blamed for reporting 
errors” depicting (1) the consequence of its not ideal implementation, (2) a reinforcing loop, and (3) a 
compensating loop 
 
After elaborating the reinforcing “subtle blame” loop in more detail, workshop 
participants assigned underlying assumptions to the elements (i.e., reinforcing and 
compensating loops) of the CDI. In Figure 2 we present the final CDI together with the 
assigned basic assumptions after its elaboration and validation in two workshops. In 
developing suggestions to improve the dysfunctional cultural dynamics displayed by the 
gap (i.e., to close the gap), workshop participants primarily focus on changing the 
perception and running of both systems as separate units. One implication was to put a 
new item on the agenda of the daily morning meeting, where new insights and lessons 
learned from the reporting system (e.g., stats, specific cases) are discussed and 
communicated. This implication was quite different from previous efforts to optimize 
reporting behavior in the plant, because these mainly targeted solely plant members’ 
perception of the reporting system and its underlying conditions.    
 24 
 
5. Study 2: Validating the approach in a second nuclear power plant 
After developing and applying the assessment approach in the reference plant, a second 
assessment was conducted in another nuclear power plant (i.e., the validation plant). This 
allowed us to test our assessment approach (with slight modifications based on the 
feedback and the results of the assessment in the reference plant) in a second plant. 
Moreover, the approach could be validated with a second sample that was not involved in 
the development of the method. 
5.1 Method 
The assessment in the validation plant passed through the same assessment steps as in 
the reference plant i.e., the methods and corresponding exclusion criteria were the same. 
Only minor modifications were made. They are reported in the subsequent sections. All 
three assessment steps were evaluated by the same questionnaires as in the reference 
plant.   
 5.1.1 Artifact analysis 
The existing list of 64 safety-relevant work practices served as a starting point for the 
artifact analysis. However, after reflecting the application of the artifact analysis and 
integrating the feedback from the middle managers in the reference plant, the project 
team decided to modify the artifact analysis slightly. First, the rating method was applied 
in a group context from the very beginning. After rating each of the 64 practices, now a 
group of middle managers was instructed to name and discuss potential new and shared 
practices that were not part of the initial framework. Secondly, because some practices 
were not fully implemented but strongly supported by the managers, each practice 
(besides the actual implementation ratings and corresponding confidence and familiarity 
ratings) also had to be rated regarding to what extent plant members discuss its 
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implementation. Accordingly, this allows plant management to evaluate the degree of 
implementation of practices that were actually promoted by them. 
As target groups for this artifact analysis, 17 middle managers from the validation plant 
filled out the rating questionnaire. Middle managers’ mean length of employment was 
22.76 (SD=9.4) years.  
5.1.2 Gap analysis  
The gap analysis was conducted in the same way as in the reference plant. The relevant 
practices (identified by the artifact analysis) were fed back to members of the plant by 
means of a questionnaire. Forty four percent of all members of the validation plant 
completed the gap questionnaire; i.e., they rated the actual and ideal implementation of 
the practices. Sixty eight percent of the respondents had worked for more than 10 years 
in the plant.  
5.1.3 Assumption analysis 
The assumption analysis was conducted in the same way as in the reference plant. Twelve 
interviews with motivated insiders (who had participated and signaled their willingness 
to participate in former assessment steps) were conducted. Each interview lasted 
approximately one hour. In a second step, one day-long workshop was conducted with 
seven participants in the validation plant.  
5.2 Results 
In the following, we present the results obtained from the assessment and the evaluation 
questionnaires in the validation plant. Again, plant management had strong concerns 
regarding the confidentiality of the results. Thus, the results section is structured into two 
parts: First, a general overview of technical aspects of the assessment and its evaluation 
is given. Second, we depict some insights and experiences derived from comparing the 
assessment results of both plants.  
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5.2.1 General overview: Results from assessing safety culture in the validation plant 
Evaluation of the approach.  Similar to study 1, the three stages of the assessment in the 
validation plant were accompanied by three evaluation questionnaires. Table 3 displays 
the evaluation results of the validation plant. It becomes evident that the assessment 
approach revealed adequate validity; the usability of the developed methods is also 
evaluated as adequate, except for the description of safety culture by the CDIs, which was 
not judged significantly higher as the scale midpoint. 
 
Table 3: Evaluation results of the three assessment steps in the validation plant with corresponding results 
of t-tests (testing for deviations from the scale midpoint of 3.5) 
Items    
     
Artifact analysis M (SD) t df p 
Comprehensible phrasing of the practices 5.82 (0.73) 13.2 16 .0001 
Temporal adequacy 6.06 (0.83) 12.8 16 .0001 
Clarity of the instructions 6.24 (0.93) 12.5 16 .0001 
Effortlessness of the method 5.88 (1.36) 7.20 16 .0001 
Ease of evaluating the implemented practices 5.06 (1.35) 4.78 16 .0001 
Relatedness of practices to safety culture 6.35 (0.61) 19.4 16 .0001 
Relevance of the practices for safety 5.69 (0.70) 12.4 15 .0001 
Gap analysis M (SD) t df p 
Comprehensibility of the practices 5.47 (1.15) 26.8 243 .0001 
Temporal adequacy 4.48 (1.85) 8.26 243 .0001 
Clarity of the instructions 5.74 (1.42) 24.7 243 .0001 
Effortlessness of the method 5.29 (1.64) 17.0 243 .0001 
Ease of evaluating ideal implementation of the practices 4.96 (1.47) 15.5 243 .0001 
Ease of evaluating actual implementation of the practices 5.04 (1.28) 18.9 243 .0001 
Relatedness of practices to safety culture 6.13 (1.03) 39.7 243 .0001 
Relevance of the practices for safety 5.80 (1.10) 32.7 243 .0001 
Assumption analysis M (SD) t df p 
Practicability of the system-dynamic approach 5.17 (0.75) 5.42 5 .003 
CDIs as description of the safety culture 4.83 (0.75) 4.34 5 .007 
Transparency of the CDIs 5.67 (0.52) 10.3 5 .000 
Relevance of the CDIs 5.33 (0.52) 8.70 5 .000 
Relatedness of the CDIs to safety culture 5.83 (0.75) 7.59 5 .001 
Importance of CDIs for change 5.50 (0.55) 8.94 5 .000 
Implications for change 6.50 (0.55) 13.4 5 .000 
Structure of the workshop 5.83 (0.75) 7.59 5 .001 
Goals of the workshop 5.83 (0.41) 14.0 5 .000 
Temporal adequacy 5.83 (0.98) 5.81 5 .002 
Clarity of the instructions (validating) 5.67 (1.03) 5.14 5 .004 
Clarity of instructions (weighting) 5.83 (0.41) 14.0 5 .000 
Fun at the workshop 5.50 (0.55)    8.94 5   .000 
Bonferroni corrected α –levels: α = .007 (artifact analysis), α = .006 (gap analysis), and α = .004 (assumption analysis) 
 
Artifact analysis. By means of the modified version of the artifact analysis, 51 practices 
(from 64) were rated as relevant for plant performance. Eleven new practices that were 
not part of the initial list of practices were named by the middle managers.  
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Gap analysis. Forty four percent of members of the validation plant evaluated the selected 
62 practices according to their actual and ideal implementation. The results showed that 
in the validation plant the mean percentage of individual gaps per practice was somewhat 
lower than in the reference plant (23% vs. 28.4%). Therefore, the threshold was set to 
35% (of individual gaps per practice) in determining relevant gap-practices, resulting in 
three gap-practices for further analysis. Moreover, three best practices could be 
identified.   
Assumption analysis. Based on the results of the gap analysis, out of the three gap-practices 
three CDIs for the validation plant were developed by means of the cultural interviews. In 
the ensuing workshop the three CDIs and three best practices were validated and 10 
assumptions were assigned to them. The cultural dominance ratings led to a reduction of 
these assumptions to five. 
 
5.2.2 Further assessment results: Comparing the results of both assessments  
In the following, we summarize some results derived from comparing the assessment 
results of both plants. On the level of artifacts, the majority of rated work practices (49 
out of 64 practices) were identified as relevant in both plants. Although we found no 
major differences in the implemented work practices in both plants, they differ with 
regard to the absolute ratings, i.e., the averaged absolute ratings of implemented work 
practices differed between both plants (5.8 vs. 5.1).  
The results of the gap analysis revealed a similar picture. Although the absolute 
percentage of gaps found differed between both plants, the identified gap-practices and 
best practices, which were included for further analysis, do not differ at all. The three gap-
practices identified in the validation plant were also part of the eight gap-practices that 
were identified as relevant for further (basic assumption-) analysis in the reference plant. 
And two out of three identified best practices were identical in both plants.  
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On the level of basic assumptions we found some consistent results between both plants 
with regard to the assumptions assigned to the best practices. Members of both plants 
identified assumptions that refer to the positive effects of formalization on system safety 
(e.g., “If it is formalized, it works”, or “Conferring responsibilities improves safety”), and 
were rated as dominant assumptions in both cultures. Thus, in nearly all CDIs of both 
plants a compensation loop was integrated, which rests on those assumptions driving 
overt behavior such as formalizing and further written specification of work processes.  
However, in most of the CDIs these compensation loops did not solely show intended 
positive effects, because higher degrees of formalization either result in (delayed) 
secondary effects such as a higher workload or stronger safeguarding behavior, or do not 
solve the problem at hand (as shown in Study 1, where the compensation loop did not 
directly target at the reinforcing dynamics).  
From a methodological viewpoint, another interesting result refers to the same three gap-
practices that were identified in both plants. Although results of the gap-questionnaires 
revealed a gap in the same practices in both plants, assumption analysis uncovered 
different cultural dynamics contributing to the gaps. For instance, the practice “staff 
planning considers and counteracts a potential loss of competencies” was identified 
(based on the frequency of individual gaps) as a gap-practice in both plants. However, 
assumption analysis revealed that in one plant the consequences of the gap (i.e., a loss of 
competencies) were reinforced by assigning extra tasks to new members instead of 
working them into the job of their predecessors. This reinforcing loop was based on the 
assumption “We help each other”. In the other plant, the gap was reinforced by problems 
of hiring external experts based on the assumption that “expert knowledge cannot be 
easily transferred and has to be bought”. What is crucial here is that based on the 
questionnaire results both plants seem to have the same problem. Without digging deeper 
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cultural levels, developed interventions (e.g., optimizing the “vocational adjustment” 
process for new members) may fail (at least in one plant), because underlying cultural 
dynamics call for different solutions to — considered on a superficial level — the same 
problem.  
6. Discussion 
The goal of our research was to develop a safety culture assessment approach for nuclear 
power plants based on Schein’s culture model. Specifically, the developed approach aimed 
at unfolding deeper levels of culture, and, at the same time, being applicable by 
practitioners and transparent in producing meaningful results. Therefore, a three-step 
assessment approach was developed, applied, and evaluated in two nuclear power plants. 
The evaluation results in both plants revealed that the developed approach has adequate 
validity with regard to the obtained results and their perceived linkage to the safety 
culture. The application of the method was predominantly rated as transparent and 
comprehensible. Moreover, it became evident that providing plant members with a 
language for describing complex cultural dynamics facilitates the derivation and 
discussion of basic assumptions and their influence on safety-related behavior.  Besides 
the attainment of these intended goals, the application of our assessment approach also 
revealed secondary beneficial effects as stated by the top management of both plants. The 
results of the gap analysis were regarded as important feedback for plant management, 
because they allowed re-evaluating the implementation and the perceived value of 
specific practices that had been promoted by the top management in the past. 
Furthermore, management emphasized the importance of providing a “balanced” view of 
safety culture, i.e., feeding back positive (best practices) and dysfunctional effects (CDIs) 
on safety culture and associated basic assumptions, which seemed to be a necessary 
precondition to obtain acceptance of the approach and its results.  
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The developed approach clearly promotes a system view of safety culture. Therefore, it 
meets the criticism of several safety scientists (e.g., Reimann & Rollenhagen, 2014; 
Hopkins, 2002) disqualifying the concept from its assumed system-oriented view of 
safety. Due to guiding plant members in eliciting basic assumptions by means of the 
system dynamics approach (e.g., Marais et al., 2006), we were able to stimulate sense-
making processes on a system level, where plant members automatically focused on 
management behavior (as prime driver of culture according to Schein, 2014). It became 
evident that one of the main barriers in adopting a system view of culture was missing 
capabilities by plant members to express and describe complex cultural dynamics. The 
system dynamics approach provides a simple-to-learn language (i.e., reinforcing and 
compensating loops) to describe complex processes and therefore allows communicating 
and resolving system issues.  
On a theoretical level, the results of both our studies refer to a long-standing paradox in 
research on safety culture. According to Pidgeon (1998), culture acts simultaneously as a 
precondition for safe operations as well as an incubator for hazards or, in Silbey’s (2009) 
words, “unusual events and accidents are generated by the same cognitive processes that 
enable the ordinary, routine interactions of daily life” (p. 357). The results of the 
assumption analysis in study 1 showed that the elicited assumptions “Word goes around 
who made the error” and “Don’t be a jackass” may also have the potential to motivate 
safety-directed behavior; for instance, these assumptions can foster behavior such as 
communicating errors (“Word gets around who made the error”) or expressing a strong 
preference for an error-free work environment (“Don’t be a jackass”). However, with 
regard to the functioning of a reporting system these assumptions triggered dysfunctional 
dynamics promoting blame and underreporting of errors. Similarly, the assumption “If it 
is formalized, it works”, which was derived from identified best practices in both plants, 
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seems to be an important and necessary pre-condition for safe work in nuclear power 
plants. However, this assumption and its associated behavior may also result in safety-
critical behavior, e.g., when working conditions become more stressful and individual 
workload is high leading to dysfunctional behavior such as non-compliance and 
withholding important information. One may tentatively conclude that the disclosure of 
basic assumptions of a given culture is not enough. Especially when it comes to the 
optimization of safety culture, a directed change of assumptions (if this is possible at all) 
may also foster non-intended side effects. Thus, a culture assessment should also include 
an identification of contextual factors, in which safety behavior stemming from dominant 
assumptions in a given culture is embedded. In line with this, one may tentatively suggest 
that rather than changing assumptions, the focus should be on changing the system to 
minimize the influence of dominant assumptions in triggering dysfunctional dynamics.   
Moreover, comparing the results of both studies clearly suggests that it is worthwhile to 
dig deeper levels of culture. Whereas the artifact- and gap analysis identified similar 
safety-relevant issues in both plants, the assumption analysis revealed different 
underlying dynamics and assumptions contributing to these. Thus, changing the culture 
based solely on diagnosing manifestations on upper cultural levels (e.g., by means of 
questionnaires) runs the risk of ignoring important contributors to dysfunctional 
dynamics.  
Besides the successful development and application of our assessment approach, there 
are also several limitations. The first limitation refers to the artifact analysis, which aimed 
at the identification of practices that are perceived as relevant in a given culture based on 
its unique learning outcomes. Both applications of this method revealed that middle 
managers had problems in identifying actual implemented practices. It became evident 
that it is a hard task to rate and differentiate the practices according to the actual and a 
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somewhat wishful implementation. We tried to meet this challenge in study 2 by asking 
middle managers for practices that are often discussed in the plant. However, we assume 
that a rating method might not be the best way to exclude potential desirability and 
missing knowledge on the implementation degree of a work practice.  
A second limitation refers to the conducted gap analyses. Initially it was planned to gather 
a full set of socio-demographic data of the participants (e.g., age, position, department 
affiliation, etc.), which allows for statistically identifying potential sub-groups (and 
therefore sub-cultures) of specific gap perceptions. However, members of the works 
council had objections concerning the loss of anonymity and confidentiality of the 
obtained data. Thus, our assessment unfolded an integrative perspective on the assessed 
cultures — in contrast to a differentiating and a fragmented perspective (Martin & Frost, 
2004) — by focusing on characteristics shared by all or the majority of plant members. 
However, during the assessment (especially during the third assessment step) it became 
evident that some of the elicited assumptions were shared only by a specific subgroup 
(e.g., the operational shift personnel), but these were dropped when workshop 
participants from all departments of the plant rated their dominance in their culture. 
Thus, future applications of our approach should focus more strongly on the identification 
of subcultures and their specific assumptions.  
A final limitation refers to the missing knowledge about the successful implementation of 
safety-directed changes based on our assessment results. During our assessment in both 
plants, there were external influences on the development of interventions to optimize 
safety culture in both plants. After the German government decided to phase-out nuclear 
power industries in 2001, a new government reversed this decision in 2010 and extended 
the life spans of the country’s nuclear plants until at least 2036. But in June 2011, mindful 
of the public’s concerns about nuclear safety after the Fukushima disaster, the 
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government made a U-turn and decided to shut down the eight oldest plants immediately, 
and the nine remaining plants within the next 11 years. As a consequence, participation 
and willingness to implement interventions collapsed, i.e., planned interventions derived 
from the assessment were not pursued. We learned from this that although culture is 
supposed to be stable and hard to change, there are circumstances (in this case, political 
decisions) that have an enormous and immediate impact on culture and corresponding 
promotion of culture change, independently of internal change efforts. Thus, in future 
applications of our approach its potential in guiding and implementing cultural change 
needs to be proven.  
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